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  2Executive Summary 
 
 
This research examines the impact of institutional quality on trade in selected 
Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Four indicators of institutional quality are chosen: 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption; for 
six PICs: Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.  
  
Many of the PICs have been characterised with narrow export structures. Other 
than Fiji, most countries reveal widening long-term balance of trade deficits. PICs export 
structure is largely based on land and sea resources while machines and transport 
equipment form the major imports. In terms of markets, USA, Australia, United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, Germany and Japan are the main export markets while Indonesia, Korea, 
China and Thailand are some of the newer export markets.  
 
Maintaining strong institutions and achieving continued improvements in 
institutional quality have become a core area of policy focus for the PICs. A number of 
key reports prepared for the region specifically maintain the need to strengthen 
institutions. However, achievements in institutional quality have been disappointing with 
several PICs revealing low scores for indicators of institutional quality.  
 
  The results of our analysis involving the fixed effects model reveal that 
institutional quality matters. Our results confirm that government effectiveness matters 
more to importers than exporters while an improved regulatory environment positively 
facilitates increased levels of trade.  The results of rule of law suggest that the 
deterioration in rule of law seems to be working against improved exports for the PICs. 
The results of control of corruption variable reveal that the presence of corruption tends 
to reduce imports significantly. Turning to the trade control variables, the level of income 
is not significant while the results of the real exchange rate variable do not provide 
strong confirmation that the appreciation of exporter’s currency facilitates trade. The 
results of the technology variable provide strong support that higher levels of 
technological diffusion are vital for improved trade. The results of the trade policy 
variable confirm that living with the WTO principles of trade liberalization (tariff 
reduction) strongly facilitates more trade.  
 
Our results support the proposition that institutional quality is an integral part of 
enhancing trade for PICs. We can conclude that PICs have problems with the institutions 
that support or facilitate trade. Exports in all the six countries have not been increasing 
and in some cases the exports have actually declined. Over the last decade PICs have 
generally pursued an outward-oriented export led growth strategy. There is now 
increasing realization that institutional factors may be the missing link. This study clearly 
points out that the institutional quality in PICs is a significant factor in determining the 
level of trade. From a policy perspective, PICs would need to improve institutional 
quality so as to facilitate trade. 
 
  3Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the export, import and total trade determinants using 
reduced form equations for six Pacific Island countries with an institutional focus. 
Controlling for common determinants of trade, four indicators of institutional quality: 
government effectiveness; rule of law; regulatory quality; and control of corruption are 
chosen. The fixed effects model, controlling for AR(1) errors, indicates that improvements 
in institutional quality variables matter for improved levels of trade. The results also 
provide confirmation the appreciation of  currency does not significantly harms trade; 
higher levels of technological diffusion are vital for improved trade; and that living with 
the WTO principles of trade liberalization and becoming more outward oriented strongly 
facilitates more trade. Some policy implications are drawn. 
 
  4I. Introduction 
 
This research examines the impact of institutional quality on trade in selected 
Pacific Island countries (PICs). Many of the PICs have been characterised with narrow 
export structures, low levels of economic growth and relative poverty resulting largely 
from low levels of investment. In addition, poor social and economic infrastructure and 
high production costs have thwarted financial incentives to attract foreign direct 
investment which has been relatively low. Several countries in the region also reveal low 
ratios of exports to GDP. 
 
Weak institutions have been identified by many PICs as a key impediment to 
investment and economic growth. Recent studies indicate that for countries to fully 
integrate in the world economy and to benefit from outward oriented trade strategies, the 
functioning and quality of institutions are important. For example, ill functioning 
institutions can hinder trade (see Anderson, 2001), bad institutions can reduce the volume 
of trade (see Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) and openness and quality of institutions 
are most likely to exhibit bidirectional causality (see Dollar and Kraay, 2002). 
 
Many of the PICs are struggling to improve the institutional infrastructure but are 
constrained by lack of appropriate levels of public expenditure in this area. The focus of 
many of the PICs on trade as an engine of growth requires that they pay particular 
attention to developing the appropriate institutional mechanisms that support both 
regional and global integration of the economies. The main benefit expected out of this 
integration is expected to be enhancement of trade. Appropriate and quality institutions 
would support the PICs endeavour to enhance trade.  
 
In this paper econometric specifications of export, import and total trade 
determinants are estimated including both commonly used explanatory variables and a set 
of indicators of institutional quality. Four indicators of institutional quality are chosen: 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption; for 
six PICs: Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents an overview of the trade 
structure and performance of PICs. Section three presents an overview of institutional 
achievements. Section four discusses the literature linking institutional quality to trade. 
Section five discusses the analytical model and provides a theoretical justification of 
chosen variables. Section six discusses the data. Section seven discusses the estimation 
procedure and presents the empirical results. Section eight presents the conclusion and 
policy recommendations. 
  5 
II. Pacific Island Countries Trade Structure and Performance  
 
We analyse PICs trade structure and performance on the basis of core indicators 
of trade: export and import shares in GDP; exports and imports of main commodities; and 
the direction of trade. 
 
II.I Export and Import Share in GDP 
 
Figures 1 to 6 depict the six PICs exports and imports of goods and services as a 
percent of GDP for years 1990 to 2004. Over the period, exports of goods and services as 
a share of GDP were slightly below that of imports of goods and services for Fiji for most 
of the years between 1990 and 2000. Exports of goods and services surpassed imports of 
goods and services in the post-2000 period, hence leaving a small trade surplus. On 
average, exports of goods and services as a percent of GDP for Fiji for the 1990-2004 
period was 61 while average imports of goods and services as a share of GDP for the 

























































































Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
 
             Source of data for Figure 1: The World Bank (2006). 
  
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu’s exports and imports of goods and services 
followed a similar pattern to that of Fiji (Figures 2 and 3 respectively). In Vanuatu, 
exports as a share of GDP averaged 47 percent for the 1990 – 2004 periods while imports 
as a share of GDP average 59 percent for the same period. A notable feature in Vanuatu 
is that the country’s balance of trade has remained in deficits for the entire period 
although exports as a share of GDP rose in the post-2000 period. 
 
 
  6Figure 2. 




















































































Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
 
             Source of data for Figure 2: Asian Development Bank (2006). 
 
In the Solomon Islands, exports as a percent of GDP averaged 41 for the 1990-
2000 periods while imports as a percent of GDP averaged 43 for the same period. While 
trade gap has been much narrower than that of Vanuatu, exports and imports as a share of 
GDP followed a downward trend from 1991-2000. However, the post-2000 period saw an 
upward trend in exports as a share of GDP as well as imports as a share of GDP. 
 
Figure 3. 





















































































Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
 
            Source of data for Figure 3: The World Bank (2006). 
 
  Kiribati, Samoa and Tonga reveal huge trade gaps between exports and imports as 
a percent of GDP for the 1990-2000 periods (Figures 4, 5 and 6). In fact, in Samoa and 
Tonga, the trade gap has widened in post-2000 period. These three countries have 
continuously experienced massive trade deficits. Exports as a percentage of GDP 
averaged 24 in Kiribati; 29 in Samoa; and 19 in Tonga. On the other hand, imports as a 
percentage of GDP averaged 88 in Kiribati; 61 in Samoa; and 59 in Tonga. Narrow range 
  7of export products and rising imports has been the main cause of widening trade gap 
among these three countries. 
 
Figure 4. 




















































































Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
 
             Source of data for Figure 4: The World Bank (2006) and Asian Development  



























































































Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
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Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
 
            Source of data for Figure 6: The World Bank (2006). 
 
II.II Exports of main commodities 
 
Table 1 presents data on export composition on the basis of Standard Industrial 
Trade Classification (SITC) for 1990 and 2004 respectively. According to data in Table 1, 
in all countries, food and live animals has been the major export category. However, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu reveal a fall in this in 2004 compared to 1990. In 
the Solomon Islands, the exports of crude material increased significantly in 2004 
compared to 2001. Other major exports include re-exports for Fiji; animal, vegetable oils 
and fat for Kiribati; crude material in Samoa and Solomon Islands and miscellaneous 
manufactured goods in Tonga. 
 
Table 1. Exports by SITC Section (Percentage of Total) 
 
SITC  Fiji    Kiribati   Samoa   Solomon 
Islands 
 Tonga    Vanuatu   
  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990  2004  1990 2004  1990  2004  1990 2004 
Food and live 
Animals 
42.0 32.0  46.7 28.4  …  153.2  37.1 26.2  71.2  104.9  0.0  0.0 
Beverage and 
Tobacco 
0.1 5.1  0.0 0.0  …  20.1  0.0 0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0 
Crude materials excluding fuels  5.1  4.3  0.0  0.0  …  3.6  44.7  68.1  0.2  0.6  0.0  0.0 
Mineral  Fuels  etc  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  …  21.0  0.0 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
Animal, vegetable 
oils and fat 
0.7 0.5  27.8  17.9  …  12.1  11.5 0.0  2.6  0.1  0.0 0.0 
Chemicals  0.7 1.2  0.0 0.0  …  3.5  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
Basic  manufactures  3.4 5.0  0.0 0.0  …  19.4  0.0 0.0  8.9  0.0  0.0 0.0 
Machines,  transport  equipment  0.2 0.3  0.0 0.0  …  515.3  0.0 0.0  2.9  0.0  0.0 0.0 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
Goods 
17.1  25.4  0.1 0.5  …  13.0  0.0 0.0  12.1  1.3  0.0 0.0 
Unclassified  goods  10.7 7.8  7.2  16.5  …  0.0  6.7 5.6  2.3  0.1  0.0 0.0 
Re-exports  20.0  18.6  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
  9Source: Asian Development Bank (2006). Author’s calculation based on Asian Development 
Bank (2006) data. 
… indicates data not available. 
 
Table 2 presents data on specific export commodities. In all countries, the export 
structure is largely based on land and sea resources. For example, in Fiji up until 1987, 
sugar, molasses, canned fish, fresh fish, coconut oil, and gold were the main exports. 
Following the trade liberalisation of 1987, its export composition began to change. There 
was a major industrial expansion with the setting up of light manufacturing industry, in 
particular garments. Since then further diversification of exports has taken place. After 
the mid-1990s, the export composition expanded to include additional commodities: 
mineral water, yaqona, copra, chemicals, textiles, and footwear. Other countries reveal 
much narrower range of export commodities. For example, fish, copra and seaweed in 
Kiribati; beer, coconut cream and taro in Samoa; fish and timber in the Solomon Islands; 
fish, squash and vanilla beans in Tonga; and copra, cocoa, timber and beef in Vanuatu. 
 
Table 2. Exports by Principal Commodity (Percentage of Total). 
 Fiji    Kiribati    Samoa    Solomon 
Islands 
 Tonga   Vanuatu   
  1990  2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004 
Sugar  20.1  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Gold  6.8  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Molasses  0.6  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Coconut  oil  0.4  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  7.8    0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Fish  4.4  0.0  2.8 0.0  …  0.0  23.0  26.0  1.6 6.2  0.0 0.0 
Garments  14.3  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Textile,  Yarns  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Copra  0.0  0.0  3.0 0.0  …  0.0  4.7 5.0  0.0 0.0  4.7 7.7 
Seaweed  0.0  0.0  2.1 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Shark  Fin  0.0  0.0  0.1 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Beer  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.9  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Coconut  cream  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.6  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Taro  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.3  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Cocoa  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  2.2 1.0 
Timber  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  24.5  92.3  0.0 0.0  0.8 1.0 
Squash  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  6.1 7.1  0.0 0.0 
Vanilla  Beans  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  3.5 0.3  0.0 0.0 
Beef  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  …  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  3.3 2.7 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2006). Author’s calculation based on Asian Development 
Bank (2006) data. 
… indicates data not available. 
 
 
II.III Imports of main commodities 
 
Table 3 presents data on imports by SITC. Except for Kiribati, machines and 
transport equipment form the major import category for all other countries. In Kiribati, 
  10food and live animals is the major import category followed by animal and vegetable oils 
and fats. In Samoa, major inputs are machines and transport equipment, basic 
manufactures, food and live animals and mineral fuels. Solomon Islands, major imports 
are crude materials and food and live animals. In Tonga, major inputs are machines and 
transport equipment, mineral fuels and food and live animals. Vanuatu’s imports are 
machines and transport equipment followed by basic manufactures. 
 
Table 3. Imports by SITC Section (Percentage of Total) 
SITC  Fiji   Kiribati   Samoa   Solomon 
Island 
 Tonga   Vanuatu   
  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004 
Food and live animals  12.8  1.6  5.0  2.3 …  19.3  28.6 28.8  13.8 13.5  11.7 19.3 
Beverage and tobacco  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.0 …  1.4  0.0 0.0  4.5  14.1  3.0 3.9 
Crude materials excluding fuels  0.7  0.1  0.0 0.0  …  3.1  34.5 74.8 5.3  11.4  1.2 1.7 
Mineral  Fuels  etc  14.1 1.5  0.0 0.0 …  17.8  0.0 0.1  13.2 19.3  7.7 13.1 
Animal, vegetable oils and fat  1.0  0.1  3.0 1.5  …  2.4  8.8 0.0 0.2  0.6  0.3 0.5 
Chemicals  7.3 0.9  0.0 0.0  …  8.1 0.0 0.0  6.3 4.9  5.7 10.9 
Basic  manufactures  21.9 2.2  0.0 0.0 …  31.1  0.0 0.0  18.0 0.8  17.0 14.4 
Machines, transport equipment  30.7  2.5  0.0 0.0  …  23.8  0.0 0.0 19.0  15.3  34.0 21.4 
Miscellaneous manufactured goods  9.6  1.1  0.0 0.0  …  14.5  0.0 0.0 10.2  4.1  12.1 10.3 
Unclassified  goods  1.1 0.1  0.8 1.4 …  0.0  5.2 6.1  0.9  9.0  2.6 3.0 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2006). Author’s calculation based on Asian Development 
Bank (2006) data. 
… indicates data not available. 
 
II.IV Direction of Exports 
Table 4 presents data on direction of exports. High income countries like the USA, 
Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Germany and Japan are the main export 
markets for the Pacific Island countries. Some countries have actively sought newer 
markets. For example, Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati and Portugal for Fiji; Indonesia for Samoa; 
Korea, China and Thailand for Solomon Islands and Korea for Vanuatu. While the newer 
markets are positive developments, they are, however, small. Pacific Island countries 
need to break into more new markets so as to maintain a viable export earning capacity. 
 
Table 4. Direction of Trade of Exports (Percentage of Total) 
  Fiji   Kiribati    Samoa  Solomon
Islands 
 Tonga   Vanuatu  
  1990 2004  1990  2004 1990 2004 1990 2004 1990 2004 1990 2004
USA  8.4 23.6  8.8  …  7.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 24.5 24.9 3.8 … 
Australia 17.7  19.2  0.0  …  15.0 60.7 4.6 2.2 5.8  1.6 3.7 … 
United Kingdom  22.9  12.8  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.1 0.0 … 
Samoa  0.0 6.2  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Japan 5.9  4.1  12.1  …  0.9 1.0 42.9 9.7 44.4  51.4 21.3 … 
New  Zealand  11.7 3.7  0.0  …  33.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 14.9 3.9 0.0 … 
Tonga  0.0 3.0  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Kiribati  0.0 1.9  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Portugal  0.0 1.2  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
  11Tuvalu  0.0 1.6  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Denmark  0.0 0.0  7.8  …  0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Germany  0.0 0.0  27.5  …  13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 29.8 … 
Fiji  0.0 0.0  0.0  …  1.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 3.9 2.4 0.0 … 
Indonesia  0.0 0.0  0.0  …  0.0 17.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Korea  0.0 0.0  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 8.3 15.7 0.0 0.0 2.1 … 
China  0.0 0.0  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 0.0 28.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Thailand  0.0 0.0  0.0  …  0.0 0.0 6.6 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 … 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0 …  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 … 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2005). Author’s calculation based on Asian Development 
Bank (2005) data. 
… indicates data not available. 
 
  In terms of import markets, high-income countries like Australia, Singapore, New 
Zealand, Japan and USA are some of the key import markets (Table 5). Fiji is also an 
important market for Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. China is also a newer import 
market for almost all Pacific Island countries. 
 
Table 5. Direction of Trade for Imports (Percentage of Total). 
  Fiji   Kiribati   Samoa   Solomon  Islands   Tonga   Vanuatu   
  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004  1990 2004 
Australia  27.8 27.7  24.6 36.4  10.9  9.6  34.2 25.3  20.0 10.3  8.8 15.5 
Singapore  5.8  24.8  0.0 0.0  0.1 9.1  9.6  23.8  0.0 0.0  0.0 8.0 
New  Zealand 16.3 17.8  5.8  8.7  31.5 23.1  7.9  5.3  30.0 46.7  2.7  6.0 
Japan  11.0 4.2  11.6  11.0  8.8 8.1  21.1 3.6  6.0 2.5  60.9  10.7 
China  2.8 2.8  0.6 2.1  1.6 1.9  3.6 1.0  1.3 2.2  0.7 3.5 
Hong  Kong  2.9 1.8  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
USA  13.1 2.3  48.7 2.5  9.7 5.3  6.1 1.9 10.3 6.7  0.0 0.0 
Thailand  1.7 2.9  0.0 1.8  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.7 0.8  0.0 0.0 
India  0.0 2.2  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 4.8  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.2 
Indonesia  0.0 1.7  0.0 0.0  0.0 3.3  0.0 0.0  0.1 1.2  0.0 0.0 
France  0.0 0.0  0.1 4.4  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.4  2.3 1.6 
Korea  0.0 0.0  0.5 0.3  0.0 1.8  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
Fiji  0.0  0.0  0.0 24.8  1.8 17.9  0.2  3.8  12.1 21.1  0.0  4.6 
Total  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2006). Author’s calculation based on Asian Development 
Bank (2006) data. 
 
 
III. Pacific Island Countries Institutional Quality and 
Achievements 
Maintaining strong institutions and achieving continued improvements in 
institutional quality is an issue concerning many countries largely in the developing 
world. This issue has become a core area of discussion and theme of policy focus for the 
countries of the South Pacific region. A number of key reports prepared for the region 
specifically maintain the need to strengthen institutions. The Pacific Plan (see Forum 
  12Secretariat, 2005) and the recently launched “Pacific 2020 Report” by the Australian 
Agency for International Development (2006) have strongly expressed the need to invest 
in institutional strengthening for the long-term growth and development of the region. 
 
The “Pacific Plan” is built around four themes: economic growth, sustainable 
development, good governance and security through regionalism. Good governance is the 
thematic area that considers institutional issues such as law and order, regulatory barriers, 
property rights, government effectiveness and control of corruption. The Pacific 2020 
Report notes that “reform strategies have to give much more attention to institutions than 
they have to date if they are to be successful in establishing an environment that is 
conducive to economic growth” (Australian Agency for International Development, 
2006). 
 
Researchers addressing economic and trade issues among the PICs have pointed 
out that the economic and social progress for several countries in the South Pacific region 
has been disappointing over many years (see for example Prasad, 2003 and Gani, 2005). 
Equally disappointing have been achievements in institutional quality. As mentioned 
earlier, both the Pacific Plan and the Pacific 2020 Report note that several PICs have 
scored on the low side when it comes to institutional quality. In a recent study on good 
governance index for Fiji, Gani and Duncan (2006) note low levels of achievements on 
rule of law and government effectiveness variables for Fiji. In addition, in his recent 
study Saldanha (2004) has argued that governance problems in the Pacific find their roots 
deeply embedded in political and social issues such as the structures of government, the 
quality of leadership, and the capacity of civil society to hold government accountable. 
 
We give an overview of the achievements on institutional quality in PICs in this 
section. We utilize the World Bank data on good governance and analyses the 
achievements in institutional quality in six of the PICs. Figures 7 to 12 present the 
institutional quality indicators. In almost all six countries, the graphs depict low levels of 
achievements in institutional quality indicators. 
 
Fiji has experienced deterioration on rule of law, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption in the post-2002 period with scores 













  13Figure 7. 
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In Kiribati, government effectiveness and regulatory quality deteriorated since 
2000 with scores remaining below zero (Figure 8). While control of corruption of rule of 
law improved since 2000, both were on the downfall since 2002 with control of 
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  14  Institutional quality indicators in Samoa improve over the 1996-2004 period 
(Figure 9). Strong improvements are noted in rule of law remaining positive throughout 
2000-04 period. Government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption 
also had the scores in positive numbers since 2000. 
 
Figure 9. 
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  The Solomon Islands institutional indicators reveal a unique trend of all the six 
(Figure 10). The rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory and control of 
corruption all recorded negative scores in 1996 and worsened since then, all again scoring 
below zero in 2004. 
 
Figure 10. 
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  15  Tonga’s institutional achievements are no different to that of the Solomon Islands 
(Figure 11). All four indicators revealed scores below zero except for the rule of law 
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Vanuatu, too has been no different to that of Tonga and Solomon Islands (Figure 
12). All four indicators recorded negative scores for the 1996-2004 periods with 
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  16IV. Literature 
 
An important issue deserving serious attention in connection with Pacific Island 
countries achievement in trade is that several countries in this region have low levels of 
integration, more so within the Asia Pacific region, let alone the world economy. Trade 
data reveals that several countries in the region have low ratios of exports to GDP. 
Literature in international trade reveals a number of core factors likely to affect a 
country’s export performance. For example, restrictive trade policies and exchange rate 
policies are common factors for low exports for developing countries. This may well be 
applicable to the PICs, all of which are in the developing stage. In addition, inadequate 
trade facilitation infrastructure and problems with customs valuation present special 
challenges to the PICs. 
 
Studies on countries in regions other than the South Pacific have shown that more 
liberalized economies tend to adjust more rapidly from primary to manufactured exports 
(see for example, Sachs and Warner, 1995). The study by Sekkat and Varoudakis (2002) 
investigating the links between trade policy reforms and share of manufactured exports to 
GDP on the Middle East and the North Africa region (MENA) confirmed that trade 
policy matters for the region’s performance. In a recent study Meon and Sekkat (2004) 
found that for MENA countries, the deterioration in the quality of institutions was 
associated with low performance in terms of manufactured exports and foreign direct 
investment attractiveness. In another study by Achy and Sekkat (2003) examining the 
effect of exchange rate policy also confirmed similar outcomes. 
 
  However, one aspect that has received little attention in terms of trade 
performance is the effect of institutions. Studies addressing the effect of institutional 
quality on trade are rare. Achieving and maintaining strong institutions is an issue 
concerning many countries. Douglas North, the Nobel prize-winning economic historian 
has extensively emphasized the role of institutions in the process of economic progress 
(see North, 1990) while the new institutional economics, extending the range of 
neoclassical theory, shows that institutions are fundamental to the effective functioning of 
market-based economies (see for example Coase, 1998 and Rutherford, 2001). Past 
studies provide ample empirical support for this. For example, Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) 
statistical growth study shows that institutional variables (the level of competition and 
government regulation of markets) are statistically significant. In addition, Hall and Jones 
(1997) following the works of Sala-i-Martin (1997) found that poor institutions reduce 
the amount of capital stock per worker, the amount of human capital per worker and total 
factor productivity of the economy. Further, Keefer and Knack (1997) in their study 
confirmed that economies that protect property rights, that adhere to the rule of law and 
whose bureaucracies are relatively competent catch up to developed nations quickly. 
 
Governance, an essential component of the new institutional economics, is under 
widespread scrutiny in market based economies. It largely refers to the process by which 
governments are selected and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state of the 
  17institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (see Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004; Polidano, 2000; and Neumayer, 2002).  
 
While achievements in good governance vary from country to country as noted in 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004), the pace of improvements in governance 
certainly matters for integration in the world economy. Countries engaged in improving 
the dimensions that contribute to good governance are likely to improve their trade 
structure. This is particularly important for the lower and middle-income economies such 
as the PICs striving towards achieving higher levels of growth.  
 
The link between institutional quality, governance and trade is an issue that 
requires further investigation. The literature in this area is generally scarce. However, 
some researchers have documented the increasing importance of institutional quality to 
trade and the process of economic integration. For example, maintaining a fair and 
efficient public sector administration, low corruption, effective law enforcement and 
sound regulation can aid trade. While the role of institutions and governance are yet to be 
formalized as part of a coherent economic theory and growth, there is a developing body 
of empirically established associations between institutional quality and trade and they 
are receiving increasing attention and are relevant to this study.  
 
   In their theoretical analysis, Anderson and Young (1999) suggest that the lack of 
enforcement of contracts may act as a tariff on risk-neutral traders and therefore reduce 
trade. Similar sentiments are echoed by Rodrik (2002) who notes that the main 
impediments to international trade may indeed be the problem of contract enforcement. 
Corruption is another element that can impact trade. Some studies conclude that high 
trade intensity and or small populations are associated with lower corruption levels (for 
example, Ades and Di Tella, 1999 and Wei, 2000). 
 
In his study, Anderson (2001) suggested that the ill-functioning of institutions 
impairs foreign trade, as it increases both costs and risks of trading abroad. In a further 
study, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) provide empirical evidence of the impact of 
quality of institutions in trade where deterioration in the quality of institutions reduces 
foreign demand. The study by Dollar and Kray (2002) report a positive correlation 
between openness and the quality of institutions noting a potential bi-directional causality 
between the two variables. 
 
In addition to direct studies as noted above, institutions may also affect trade 
indirectly through their impact on other variables that determine trade. One core variable 
that is likely to affect trade indirectly is investment (see Rodrik, 1995; Elbadawi, 1998; 
Brunetti and Weder, 1998; Mauro, 1995 and Knack and Keefer, 1995). Another indirect 
channel is through productivity. Hall and Jones (1999) and Olson et al., 2000) note that 
deficient institutions impact productivity and growth and that lower productivity is an 
impediment to competitiveness which is likely to have negative effects on trade. Other 
similar studies include: Mauro (1995) on corruption and growth; Gould and Gruben 
(1996) on the role of intellectual property rights and economic growth; Safavian, Graham 
and Gonzalez-Vega (2001) on the impact of regulatory intrusion into enterprise activities; 
  18Barro (2001) on the relationship between the rule of law and growth; Fischer et al (2001) 
on  bureaucratic inefficiency and financial mismanagement; and Djankov et al. (2002) on 
the relationship between regulation of entry and corruption. 
 
The above review suggests that for countries to fully benefit from openness 
strategies, the functioning of institutions and institutional quality might be crucial. The 
review here does provide the conceptual framework for testing such effects. The next 
section will discuss the analytical procedure on the basis of this conceptual framework. 
 
V. Analytical Model and Theoretical Justification of Variables  
 
The strategy that we employ to assess the impact of institutional quality on trade 
includes testing a set of standard variables that affect trade, hereby referred to as control 
variables and a set of explanatory variables that refers specifically to institutional quality. 
The relationship that we estimate is therefore represented by the following reduced form 
equations. 
 
it it it it it it it it it it cc rl rq ge tp tec rer gnit tx μ α α α α α α α α α + + + + + + + + + = 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 (1) 
it it it it it it it it it it cc rl rq ge tp tec rer gnid ti μ β β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + + = 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  (2) 
it it it it it it it it it it cc rl rq ge tp tec rer gnit tt μ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + + + + + = 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0       (3) 
it it it it it it it it it it cc rl rq ge tp tec rer gnid tt μ η η η η η η η η η + + + + + + + + + = 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0      (4) 
 
Where, tx is total exports; ti is total imports; tt is total trade; gnit is gross national 
income for trading partners; gnid is the gross national income for the domestic economy; 
rer is the real exchange rate; tec is technology; tp is trade policy; ge is government 
effectiveness; rq is regulatory quality; rl is rule of law; cc is control of corruption; i is the 
country, t is the time period and υis the error term. Equation (1) is the export equation; 
equation (2) is the import equation; and equations (3) and (4) represent total trade. 
 
  We include three separate measures of the dependent variable: the ratio of exports 
to GDP (equation 1); the ratio of imports to GDP (equation 2) and the ratio of total trade 
to GDP (equations 3 and 4). Our measures of trade control variables are per capita gross 
national income (domestic as well as the trading partners); the real exchange rate; 
technology and trade policy. We choose four measures of institutional quality: 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law and control of corruption. The 
actual measures of each of these variables are discussed in section five. A discussion on 
the theoretical justification of our chosen variables follows. 
 
 The  per capita gross national income is chosen as a control variable because an 
improvement and expansion of trade is essentially attracted by robust domestic economy, 
indicating that economic conditions are suitable for investment, production and sales (see 
for example, Frankel and Romer, 1999). A growing economy indicates the extent to 
which factors favour trade (right economic policies, rising incomes, price stability and so 
on). An economy, whose economic infrastructure favours production encourages 
  19individuals to engage in creation and transaction of goods and services, contributes to 
exports and imports of goods and services and enhances trade. An economy in which 
income growth remains stagnant may discourage trade. We choose both the per capita 
gross national income for the domestic economy, gnid, and the per capita gross national 
income for the trading partners, gnit, as measures of income. The level of gnid matters 
more to importers while gnit matters more to exporters.  
 
 The  real exchange rate (rer) is included as it is a useful general indicator of a 
country’s international price competitiveness (Pugel, 2004). International price 
competitiveness is regarded as a key determinant of a country’s international trade in 
goods and services. If the price of foreign goods and services relative to the price of 
domestic economy’s goods and services is higher, domestic demand for imports tend to 
be lower and foreign demand for domestic goods and services tend to be higher. If 
competitiveness improves, exports increase and imports decline. 
 
We include the technology (tec) variable as it is hypothesized that differences in 
production technologies is one of the basis of comparative advantage. Differences in 
technology between countries can be a basis for trade (Yanikkaya, 2003). In general, the 
technology explanation for trade is that countries export products in which they have 
relative technology advantages. The diffusion of new technology is also important in 
trade. Imports of capital goods that embody foreign technology increases the diffusion of 
new technology into a country thus improving its trading position. 
 
  We also control for trade policy (tp). Trade policy can determine the degree of a 
country’s outward or inward orientation (see for example, Yanikkaya, 2003). An outward 
oriented trade strategy is one in which trade and industrial policies do not discriminate 
between production for domestic markets and exports or between purchases of domestic 
goods and foreign goods. By contrast, an inward oriented strategy is one in which trade 
and industrial incentives are biased in favour of production for the domestic over the 
export market. Inward regimes are generally characterized by high levels of protection 
and direct controls on imports and investments. On the other hand, outward orientation 
links domestic economies to the world economy. Available evidence suggests that 
outward oriented trade policies have been more successful than inward oriented trade 
policies (for example, Krueger, 1978 and Edwards, 1993). 
 
  The  indicator,  government effectiveness (ge), captures the state’s ability to 
develop and implement sound policies, efficiently deliver public goods and services, and 
enforce rules uniformly. Bureaucratic efficiency can promote speedy progress in trade 
and investment. But, governments that exert discretionary power over exporters and 
importers can have regressive effects on their production process and reduce the level of 
trade. The competence and efficiency of the civil service in carrying out governments day 
to day duties is essential for exporters and importers alike. For example, excessive red 
tape, bureaucratic inefficiency and perceptions of financial mismanagement can deter 
trade.  
 
  20Regulatory quality (rq) refers to the extent to which government policies promote 
or inhibit market activity. Gausch and Hahn (1997) state that “the overall lesson is not 
that regulation is generally undesirable, but it often has undesirable economic 
consequences. Regulatory intrusion into market enterprise activities, largely dominated 
by exporters and importers, can lead to corruption. For example, Djankov et al (2002) in 
their analysis of regulation of entry found that heavy regulation of entry for firms is 
associated with greater corruption and larger unofficial economies. This certainly can 
work against the interest of those involved with the trade sector. 
The rule of law (rl) addresses the interactions between citizens and the institutions 
that assist in governing these interactions. Institutions like the judiciary should exhibit 
characteristics such as fairness and efficiency in its delivery plays an important role in 
facilitating sound and fair observance of the rule of law, including the maintenance of 
law and order, limitations on government power to interfere in business activities and 
trading environment, and impartial enforcement of contracts. The maintenance of law and 
order, enforcement of contracts and a fair and predictable legal system can have 
important bearing on a country’s overall trade. Countries that facilitate sound and fair 
observance of the rule of law are likely to enhance their exports, imports and total trade. 
The presence of corruption (cc) (the abuse of public power for private benefit) in 
the public sector can also negatively affect economic activity (see for example, Bardhan, 
1997). Corruption can allow politicians to skew government institutions in one’s favour 
(Van den Berg, 2001). For example, honesty of the civil service workforce is an essential 
component and the absence of bribes; rent seeking through bribes by civil servants from 
private producers should directly encourage investment and trade. Tanzi and Davodi 
(1998) in their study of corruption note that “in cases of extreme corruption, maintenance 
of physical infrastructure is intentionally neglected thus allowing corrupt officials to 
extract additional commission for new investment projects. In such cases, if foreign 
investors are targeted, it would act as a deterrent for FDI. Since foreign investors also 





We focus our discussion on PICs trade and institutional data. Our analytical 
procedure is largely dictated by data availability on core variables of concern. While 
long-term time series data on trade control variables are available, this is not the case for 
institutional variables. The measures of institutional variables are available for seven 
points in time (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005). Further, not all of the 
sample countries have consistent series of data on the control variables, and where data is 
available the time span is limited. This is a major problem across several PICs with the 
exception of Fiji. We restrict our sample period that matches the period of published data 
on institutional variables, hence the sample time period here includes years 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
 
  21The countries chosen are: Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and 
Vanuatu. While a number of other PICs have published data on institutional variables, 
they lack published data on trade and trade control variables. Hence, our choice of 
countries was limited to six. 
 
We construct four different models of trade as represented by equations (1) to (4) 
in section four. In equation (1), the dependent variable is measured by total exports as a 
share of GDP. In equation (2), the dependent variable is measured as total imports as a 
share of GDP. In equations (3) and (4), the dependent variable is measured as total trade 
as a share of GDP. We distinguish between exports and imports because incomes and 
exchange rate movements are likely to affect them in different ways. The source of data 
for all of the three measures of dependent variable is the World Bank (2006) and the 
Asian Development Bank (2006). For Solomon Islands, the source of data was South 
Pacific Commission (2006).  
 
The exchange rate is measured by real exchange rate index where the base year is 
2000. While Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu have their own currencies, 
Kiribati on the other hand has adopted the Australian dollar. Hence, for Kiribati, we use 
the real exchange rate index for the Australian dollar where the base year is 2000. The 
source of data for the real exchange rate index is International Monetary Fund (2005). 
 
The  domestic income is measured by gross national income per capita in US 
dollars. The source of data is the World Bank (2006).  
 
The foreign income is measured by gross national income per capita in US dollars 
for the major trading partners. Our scanning of trade partner statistics revealed that 
Australia, Japan or United States of America are one of the main trading partners of the 
six selected countries. Hence, we measure the foreign income as the average gross 
national income per capita of these three major trading partners. The source of data for 
this variable is the World Bank (2006). 
 
The trade policy is measured by average applied tariff rates. With the exception of 
Kiribati and Tonga, statistics on average applied tariff rates was available for the other 
four countries. We used the developing country average applied tariff rates for Kiribati 
and Tonga. The source of data was the World Bank (2006).  
 
The technology variable is measured by mobile telephone diffusion rate. This is 
the mobile telephone users per 1,000 people in a given country in a given year. The 
source of data for this variable is the World Bank (2006). 
 
Four measures of institutional quality are chosen: the rule of law, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption. The source of data for these 
indicators is the World Bank (2006). These authors also provide a comprehensive 
discussion of their data sources, measures and interpretation of the scores for each of 
these core variables. 
 
  22VII. Estimation Procedure, Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
The estimation methodology adopted here incorporates pooled data. Because of 
the number of observations restricting the number of degrees of freedom, the procedure 
of a pooled analysis of time-series cross section data is employed as it is most appropriate 
given the nature of the data that is available. As such a total of 6 countries and 4 time 
periods are used for the pooled of analysis. We utilize two separate estimation procedures: 
the fixed effects estimation and the fixed effects corrected for AR(1) errors. 
  
As mentioned above the time series observation for all the countries is pooled and 
the regression coefficients are obtained by ordinary least square (OLS) method of 
estimation. While our sample of countries falls in the same geographical latitude and with 
somewhat similar economic structures, the trading structure differs from one country to 
another. For example, the trading environment of Fiji is significantly different to that of 
Kiribati. Our estimation procedure takes into account of such differences. Hence, we 
recognize the cross-country differences by allowing different intercepts in the estimation 
process. Cross-country variables are included as regressors and the equations are 
estimated, hence, the fixed effects model.  
    
Tables 6 and 7 present the empirical results. An important concern with the use of 
panel data is the issue of hetroskedasticity. We account for this in our estimation phase. 
The results in Table 1 report the Lagrangian Multiplier statistics for testing the cross-
section hetroskedasticity. The results report the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
statistic for a test for a diagonal covariance matrix. This means no cross-section 
correlation. We first consider the estimation results for the fixed effects model (Table 6). 
A separate dummy variable is included for each country. We utilize a no-constant option 
in our estimation procedure so as to avoid the commonly known dummy variable trap. 
Based on the estimated residuals, our test statistics for cross-section heteroskadasticity is 
3.22 for exports, 10.33 for imports; and 2.98 and 2.19 for total exports respectively. For 
exports and total trade, this is insignificant. We also test the null hypothesis of equality of 
the country intercepts against the alternative hypothesis of some differences. The F-test 
statistic is low giving strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
  
Overall, while our results in Table 6 do present several expected effects, our 
estimation results also suggest autocorrelated errors within the cross-sections. Thus, we 
correct for the AR (1) errors while still utilizing the fixed effects model. We also obtain 
the hetroskedasticity consistent standard errors using the Beck and Katz (1995) procedure. 
The results are presented in Table 7. We focus our discussion of results as per estimates 
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Tables 6 and 7 report the empirical results of the fixed effects model and fixed 
effects model corrected for AR(1) errors respectively. The estimates obtained seem 
satisfactory given the data limitations among the Pacific Island countries chosen in this 
study. The explanatory power ranges from 0.33 to 0.85 and is considered highly 
satisfactory given the use of panel data. Several variables show the expected sign and 
some are statistically significant. 
 
  Equations (1) to (4) are estimated. In the export equation (equation 1), we include 
the per capita income of the trading partners where as in the import equation (equation 2) 
we replace this with the per capita income of the domestic economy. Equations (3) and (4) 
are total trade equations and we test for both, the per capita income of trading partners 
(equation 3) and the per capita income in the domestic economy (equation 4). The results 
involving the fixed effects model corrected for AR(1) errors (Table 7) reveal that the 
coefficient of institutional indicators with the expected positive signs in most of the 
equations and, thus, consistent with our a priori expectations. 
 
  Starting with institutional variables, government effectiveness matters more to 
importers than exporters. In the export equation, the coefficient has a negative sign 
although statistically insignificant. In the import equation government effectiveness has a 
positive coefficient but statistically insignificant. The results of the import equation 
means that an improvement in government effectiveness is weakly associated with 
increased imports.  
 
 The  regulatory quality variable is positive across all the equation and the sign 
obtained for the coefficient is consistent with our a priori expectations. While it is 
statistically insignificant in the export, the coefficient is statistical statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level for the import equation. Similarly, it is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level (equation 3) when total trade is taken into account. The 
results for the regulatory quality variable suggest that improved regulatory environment 
is essential as it positively facilitates increased levels of trade.   
 
 The  rule of law variable has a negative and statistically significant (at the 1 
percent level) coefficient for the export equation. The same effect is also shown once 
total trade is taken into account, however, the coefficient remains statistically 
insignificant. Interestingly, the coefficient of rule of law is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent levels for the import equation. One reason for the low levels 
of significance when total trade is considered is that a number of Pacific Island countries 
(Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) had poor scores for the rule of law indicator of 
institutional quality. For example, Fiji since 1987 coups has seen deterioration in its law 
and order situation. This further deteriorated after the attempted putsch of 2000 and likely 
to deteriorate further given the December 2006 military takeover of the government. In 
the Solomon Islands the civil war has led to a serious break down in the law and order 
situation. Vanuatu did not have major political or civil strife but the institutions 
governing law and order have been weak. The results obtained here certainly suggest that 
  26the deterioration in rule of law seems to be strongly working against improved exports for 
the Pacific Island countries.   
 
 The  control of corruption variable has the expected positive coefficient for 
exports and total trade and negative for imports. In all cases the coefficients are 
statistically significant. The negative coefficient for imports is not surprising. Its shows 
the presence of corruption tends to reduce imports. One possible outcome is that 
corruption adds more to the costs of importers and the possibility of bribery and 
kickbacks at ports of entry for clearance of goods is likely to eventuate. Thus, importers 
welfare is worsened. 
 
Turning to the trade control variables, the results obtained are more robust. The 
level of income in three of the four equations has a negative coefficient. We expected a 
positive coefficient for this variable meaning that if a country’s trading partners income 
levels rise, they will increase their demand for goods produced in that country, thereby 
raising its exports. Our results do support this line of contention only for total trade where 
income is measured by domestic per capita income. 
 
The real exchange rate variable has a positive but statistically insignificant sign 
on its coefficient for all except the import equation, inconsistent with our a priori 
expectations. The results of the do not provide any strong confirmation that the 
appreciation of exporter’s currency enhances overall trade. 
 
We obtain highly robust results for the technology (total trade) and trade policy 
variable (imports and total trade). The results of the technology variable provide support 
that higher levels of technological diffusion are vital for improved trade. The results of 
the trade policy variable confirm that gradual trade liberalization through tariff reduction 
strongly facilitates more trade.  
  27VII. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
 
This paper investigated the determinants of export, import and total trade 
including both traditional explanatory variables and a set of indicators of institutional 
quality. Four indicators of institutional quality are chosen: government effectiveness, rule 
of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption; for six Pacific Island countries: Fiji, 
Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Our results of fixed effects model 
controlling for AR(1) errors provides evidence that improvements in government 
effectiveness is associated with increased imports; improved regulatory environment 
positively facilitates increased levels of trade; deterioration in rule of law seems to be 
working against improved exports for the Pacific Island countries; presence of corruption 
tends to reduce imports; appreciation of exporter’s currency does not significantly harm 
trade; higher levels of technological diffusion are vital for improved trade; and living 
with the WTO principles of trade liberalization and becoming more outward oriented 
strongly facilitates more trade. 
 
Our results support the proposition that institutional quality is an integral part of 
enhancing trade for a country. Generally we can conclude from the results that Pacific 
Island countries have problems with the institutions that support or facilitate trade. It is 
also in keeping with trends we have seen in these countries over the last ten years. 
Exports in all the six countries have not been increasing and in some cases the exports 
have actually declined. In the case of Fiji, trade deficit has been continually rising with 
exports declining over the last 5 years. 
 
Over the last decade Pacific Island Countries have generally pursued an outward-
oriented export led growth strategy. However, the results from this policy approach, has 
been disappointing to say the least. Attempts to raise investment in key export sectors in 
these countries have not been successful. Many of the countries including Fiji have 
provided standard financial incentives such as tax free status to export industries. Many 
developing countries in other regions have also grappled with the lack of investment in 
areas which support export and trade in general. There is now increasing realization that 
institutional factors may be the missing link. As discussed earlier, there is more research 
today informing countries that they ought to improve the institutional environment to 
enable the growth of trade and investment. 
 
This study clearly points out that the institutional quality in the selected countries 
is a significant factor in determining the level of trade. From a policy perspective, PICs 
would need to go beyond the study of various types of institutions to the quality of these 
institutions if they are to increase their export potential. It is no secret that PICs face 
competition from many countries which are at similar levels of development for 
investment and trade. It is therefore imperative for PICs to look for that marginal 
competitive edge to separate themselves from many others who face similar difficulties. 
Improving institutional quality, especially those which are required to facilitate trade and 
investment, may provide this edge. 
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 Fiji  Kiribati Samoa  Solomon  Islands  Tonga  Vanuatu 
Sugar 20.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Gold 6.8  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Molasses 0.6  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Coconut oil  0.4  0.0 0.0   0.0  0.0
Fish 4.4  2.8 0.0 26.0 6.2  0.0
Garments 14.3  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Textile, Yarns  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Copra 0.0  3.0 0.0 5.0 0.0  7.7
Seaweed 0.0  2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Shark Fin  0.0  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Beer 0.0  0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0  0.0
Coconut cream  0.0  0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0  0.0
Taro 0.0  0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.0
Cocoa 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  1.0
Timber 0.0  0.0 0.0 92.3 0.0  1.0
Squash 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1  0.0
Vanilla Beans  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3  0.0
Beef 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  2.7
 
SITC Fiji Kiribati Samoa Solomon  Islands  Tonga Vanuatu
   
Food and live animals  1.6 2.3 19.3 28.8  13.5 19.3
Beverage and tobacco  0.1 0.0 1.4 0.0  14.1 3.9
Crude materials excluding fuels  0.1 0.0 3.1 74.8  11.4 1.7
Mineral Fuels etc  1.5 0.0 17.8 0.1  19.3 13.1
Animal, vegetable oils and fat  0.1 1.5 2.4 0.0  0.6 0.5
Chemicals 0.9 0.0 8.1 0.0  4.9 10.9
Basic manufactures  2.2 0.0 31.1 0.0  0.8 14.4
Machines, transport equipment  2.5 0.0 23.8 0.0  15.3 21.4
Miscellaneous manufactured goods  1.1 0.0 14.5 0.0  4.1 10.3
Unclassified goods  0.1 1.4 0.0 6.1  9.0 3.0
 
  31